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Costs and benefits of monetary union for a Central European country :  
the theory 
 
The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) has analysed the conditions that 
countries should satisfy if they want to profit from joining a monetary union. The 
main insights of the theory can be summarised as follows. When countries are 
different in economic structures, they are likely to face ‘asymmetric shocks’. In the 
absence of the exchange rate instrument, they will need a lot of flexibility in their 
labour markets (e.g. wage flexibility, labour mobility) so as to adjust to these 
asymmetric shocks and to prevent these shocks from leading to permanent 
unemployment. The OCA-theory also stresses that the cost of relinquishing the 
exchange rate instrument declines with the openness of the country. For very open 
countries the exchange rate instrument loses much of its effectiveness to affect output 
and employment, and therefore to correct for asymmetric shocks. Thus, very open 
(and typically small) countries bear fewer costs by joining a monetary union than 
large and relatively closed economies. Conversely, the benefits of a single currency 
increase with the degree of openness of a country, because more contracts involve 
exchange rate transactions in small open economies than in large and relatively closed 
one.  
We can represent the main insights of the OCA-theory graphically as follows. On the 
vertical axis we set out the degree of divergent movements of output and employment 
between a representative Central European country (CE-country) and the European 
Union. We call this the degree of economic divergence1. On the horizontal axis we set 
out a measure of the degree of trade integration between these countries. This 
measure could be the trade of the CE-country with the EU-countries as a share of the 
CE-country’s GDP. The downward sloping line (TT) says that as trade integration 
between The CE-country and the EU increases the degree of economic divergence 
between the countries involved declines, i.e. countries become more alike and face 
less asymmetric shocks. The presumption here is that economic integration between 
the CE-country and the EU will take the form of intra-industry specialisation. As a 
result, when a shock occurs in one industry, it will affect all countries in a similar 
                                                 
1 We could take as measure of divergence one mines the correlation coefficient between the 
growth rates of output of these countries. Thus when the correlation is one, our measure of 
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way. (This is only one view, however. There is another view, however, that will be 
discussed shortly).  
The upward sloping line (called OCA) represents the combinations of divergence and 
trade integration that makes monetary union a break-even operation (costs = benefits). 
It is derived as follows. The OCA-theory tells us that as trade integration increases the 
benefits for the CE-country rise and the costs decline. Put differently, the net gains of 
a monetary union increase with the degree of trade integration. At the same time,  
when economic divergence increases, the costs of a monetary union increase. The two 
phenomena together allow us to interpret the upward sloping OCA-schedule as 
follows: an increase in economic divergence makes a monetary union more costly; 
this increase in the cost of a monetary union, however, is offset by increasing 
economic integration. All points on the OCA-line are then combinations of 
divergence and integration for which the monetary union has a zero net gain. Note 
that all the points to the right of the OCA-line are points for which the benefits of  




 Figure 1: Costs and benefits of monetary integration for the CE-country 
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divergence is zero. When the correlation is -1 our measure of divergence would be 2, its 
maximum value.  
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The effect of changes in labour market flexibility can be presented by shifts in the 
OCA-line. When labour market flexibility increases, the cost of a monetary union 
declines. Thus, a country can afford to experience larger asymmetric shocks and still 
find monetary union gainful. The OCA-line shifts upwards when labour market 
flexibility increases. This also increases the size of the OCA-zone relative to the non-
OCA-zone.  
The crucial question now is where we should put the CE-country? In figure 1 we have 
put the CE-country on the downward sloping TT-line to the left of the OCA-line. That 
is, we assume that today the CE-country is not yet part of the European optimum 
currency area, basically because the degree of economic divergence is still to high 
and/or the degree of trade integration to low. This is however a purely empirical 
matter. We will return to this issue in section  where we analyse some of the 
important factors to check whether our hypothesis is the right one.  
The model of figure 1, allows us to say something about the long-term perspectives of 
monetary union for the CE-country. As trade integration between the CE-country and 
the EU proceeds, the CE-country will be moving downwards along the TT-line. This 
will inevitably bring the country into the OCA-zone. Thus, in this view, monetary 
unification of the CE-country with the EU will increasingly become more profitable. 
In this sense monetary union of the CE-country with the EU is inevitable.  
The analysis of  figure 1 also makes clear that steps towards increasing the degree of 
labour market flexibility in the CE-country speed up the moment in which a monetary 
union yields a net gain for the CE-country. Graphically policies introducing more 
flexibility in the labour market shift the OCA-curve upwards and bring the CE-
country closer to the OCA-zone (they could even bring the CE-country immediately 
into the OCA-zone).  
The view presented in figure 1 can be called the conventional view of the dynamics of 
monetary integration. It has been defended most forcefully by the European 
Commission in its well-known report ‘One Market. One Money’. There is an 
alternative view, however, that can be derived from Krugman’s analysis of the effects 
of economic integration on the occurrence of asymmetric shocks. This view is based 
on the idea that by increasing the size of  the markets, economic integration leads to a  
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better exploitation of (static and dynamic) economies of scale. As a result, economic 
integration leads to regional concentration and agglomeration effects. This leads to a 
more specialised industrial structure of countries, which in turn increases the 
probability of asymmetric shocks. Thus, in this view economic integration leads to 
more divergence in the growth rates of output and employment between countries. 
We represent this alternative view in figure 2. Instead of a downward sloping TT-line 
we have a positively sloped TT-line. Thus, when economic integration between the 
CE-country and the EU increases, the CE-country becomes more specialised so that it 
will be subjected to more rather than less asymmetric shocks2.  
We now have to consider two possibilities for the long-term prospects of monetary 
union. One is represented by the TT-line, the slope of which is flatter than the slope of 
the OCA-line. In this case, although today the CE-country may not be an optimum 
currency area, it will move into the OCA-zone over time. In this case more integration 
leads to more specialisation and thus more asymmetric shocks. However, the benefits 
of a monetary union also increase steeply with the degree of integration. As a result, 
despite the increase in asymmetric shocks, more integration will lead the CE-country 
into the OCA-zone.  
The second case is represented by the steep TT’-line. Here integration brings the CE-
country increasingly farther away from the OCA-zone. This is so because the net 
gains of a monetary union do not increase fast enough with the degree of integration. 
As a result, the costs of divergence overwhelm all the other benefits a monetary union 
may have. In the long run the prospects for a monetary union of the CE-country with 
the EU-15 are poor.  
From the discussion of the Krugman model we conclude that even if integration leads 
to more asymmetric shocks, this may still lead to increasing net gains of a monetary 
union for the CE-country. We cannot exclude, however, that the process of integration 
will make monetary union for the CE-country more and more unattractive.  
 
                                                 
2 This view could also be associated with Peter Kenen who stressed that countries with a less 
diversified output structure are subject to more asymmetric shocks making them less suitable 
to form a monetary union. The presumption is that small countries who are highly integrated 
with the rest of the world are also highly specialised. This leads to the paradox that small and 
very open countries should keep their own currencies and not join a monetary union (see 








 Figure 2: The Krugman view of monetary integration 
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What is the right view of the world? A clear-cut answer will be difficult to formulate. 
Nevertheless it is reasonable to claim that a presumption exists in favour of the 
European Commission view. The reason can be formulated as follows. The fact that 
economic integration can lead to concentration and agglomeration effects cannot be 
disputed. At the same time, however, it is also true that as market integration between 
countries proceeds, national borders become less and less important as factors that 
decide about the location of economic activities. As a result, it becomes more and 
more likely that concentration and agglomeration effects will be blind for the 
existence of borders. This creates the possibility that the clusters of economic activity 
will encompass borders. Put differently, it becomes more and more likely that the 
relevant regions in which some activity is centralised will transgress one or more 
borders. For example, it could very well be that the agglomeration effects lead to 
concentration of industries in Northern Italy and Slovenia. If this is the case, shocks in 
these industries will affect Italy and Slovenia, so that the lira/tolar rate cannot be used 
to absorb this shock. 
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Note that the argument we develop here is not that integration may not lead to 
concentration effects (it probably will), but rather that national borders will 
increasingly be less relevant in influencing the shape of these concentration effects. 
As a result, regions may still be very much affected by asymmetric shocks. The 
probability that  these regions overlap existing borders, however, will increase as 
integration moves on. We conclude that the economic forces of integration are likely 
to rob the exchange rates between national currencies of their capacity to deal with 
these shocks. 
From the preceding arguments it should not be concluded that economists know for 
sure what the relationship is between economic integration and the occurrence of 
asymmetric shocks. All we can say is that there is a theoretical presumption in favour 
of the hypothesis that integration will make asymmetric shocks between nations less 
likely. The issue remains essentially an empirical one. Recently, Frankel and Rose  
(1996) have undertaken important empirical research relating to this issue. They 
analysed the degree to which economic activity between pairs of countries is 
correlated as a function of the intensity of their trade links. Their conclusion was that 
a closer trade linkage between two countries is strongly and consistently associated 
with more tightly correlated economic activity between the two countries. In terms of 
figures 1 and 2 this means that the relationship between divergence and trade 
integration is negatively sloped.  
Similar evidence is presented in Artis and Zhang(1995), who find that as the 
European countries have become more integrated during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
business cycles of these countries have become more correlated.  
 
2. Costs and benefits of monetary union for the CE-country : some empirical 
tests 
 
In this section we develop some empirical tests to find out whether our hypothesis 
about the location of the CE-country in figure 1 is the correct one. The reader should 
be warned that these empirical tests are far from definitive. They can only give some 
approximate idea about the costs and benefits of a monetary union for  the CE-
country.  
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The OCA-theory has identified three sets of factors that matter in determining 
whether the CE-country would benefit from a monetary union. These are : 
• The degree of trade integration of the CE-country with the EU and its likely future 
development. 
• The size and the frequency of asymmetric shocks to which the CE-country is likely 
to be subjected. In this context the different economic and industrial structure of 
the CE-country versus the other EU-countries matters. 
• The degree of flexibility of the labour markets in the CE-country. 
 
In this section we concentrate our attention on the nature of the asymmetric shocks in 
the CE-country. We use a panel data model that allows us to find out to what extent 
the growth rates of output and employment in the CE-country have been different 
from those observed in the European Union. Ideally one should separate the shocks 
that are induced by different monetary policies (and that will disappear in a future 
monetary union) from the shocks that are structural (and that will not disappear in a 
monetary union). A procedure to separate these shocks has been proposed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989). This consists in using the neo-classical macroeconomic 
model to separate demand and supply shocks in the times series of output and 
employment. It is reasonable to assume that demand shocks are very much 
conditioned by the nature of the monetary regime, whereas supply shocks are not. Put 
differently, in a monetary union supply shocks will not disappear. As a result, an 
analysis of the degree of correlation of these supply shocks across countries can teach 
us whether these countries are likely to be hit by asymmetric shocks once they form a 
monetary union. In so doing, we gain insights into an important question, i.e. the size 
of the asymmetric shocks that potential members of a monetary union will face. (For 
applications of the Blanchard-Quah procedure see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) 
and (1996), Elke-Roussel and Mélitz (1995). 
Unfortunately, this procedure requires relatively long time series. These are as yet 
unavailable for central European countries. As a result, we will rely on a procedure 
which does not attempt to separate demand and supply shocks.  
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The model used in this paper aims at separating the common (international) and the 
country (asymmetric) sources of shocks in output and employment.3 In order to do so, 
we proceed in two steps.  We first specify a static panel data model. In a second step 
we add some dynamics to the model. 
 
2.1 The static model 
The static model is specified as follows: 
 
        T-1  N-1 
 ∆yi.t = a  + Σ btD  +  Σt   ciDi  + ei,t     (1) 
         t                    i 
 
where  ∆yi.t is the percentage change in the dependent variable (GDP, employment, 
and industrial production, respectively) in year t and country i; a is the constant term; 
Dt is a set of time dummies, one for each year; Di is a set of country dummies, one for 
each country; and ei,t is the disturbance term to country i at time t and assumed to be 
an i.i.d. random variable.  
In this simple form the model explains yearly changes in, say, GDP of country i by 
two variables. The first one is the common shock Dt. This variable expresses the 
influence exerted each year by a component which is common to all countries in the 
sample. The second variable is the country specific (asymmetric) shock, Di. The latter 
measures the extent to which the yearly changes in GDP of country i differ from the 
changes observed in the other countries in the sample. In both sets of variables we 
have imposed two necessary normalisations to avoid perfect co-linearity. We will set 
a benchmark country, here Germany, taking the value zero and a benchmark year, the 
last year of the sample taking the value of zero. Accordingly the estimated 
coefficients of the country dummies should be interpreted as differences with respect 
to Germany and those of the time dummies as differences with respect to the last year 
in the sample.  
We estimated equation (1) using data of the EU-countries and the central European 
countries during the 1990s. We had to use quarterly data and to restrict the analysis to 
                                                 
3 The model is described more fully in De Grauwe and Aksoy (1997). In this paper we also 
discuss the problems of the model.  
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the 1990s due to the limited availability of the data in central European countries.4 
The results are summarised in the following table. 5  
Table 1. Time vs. Country Effects (Static Analysis) 
∆(yi,t)  = α1+Σt
T-1 βt D t + Σ i
N-1  γi D i + ε i t 
 








Total (%)  General Time Country 
Dependent Variables ∆(yi,t) 
 
Czech Republic 
Industrial Production (93.2-95.3) 7 9 17 142 0.98 1.11 0.87 
GDP (93.2-95.4) 14 1 15 103 0.78 1.44 0.15 
Employment (93.2-95.4) 30 12 43 141 3.61* 5.69* 1.27 
 
Slovak Republic 
Industrial Production (93.2-95.3) 9 7 15 142 0.78 2.30* 0.61 
GDP (93.2-95.4) 13 2 15 103 0.76 1.38 0.17 
Employment (93.2-95.4) 34 10 43 141 3.71* 6.80* 0.92 
 
Slovenia 
Industrial Production (92.1-95.3) 18 15 33 222 3.23* 3.68* 2.80* 
GDP (93.1-95.4) 22 1 23 112 1.34 2.36* 0.08 
Employment (92.1-95.4) 38 5 42 215 4.63* 7.89* 0.88 
 
Hungary 
Industrial Production (92.1-95.3) 12 7 19 222 1.50 2.01* 0.98 
Employment (92.4-95.4) 40 7 46 170 4.54* 8.72* 0.82 
 
Poland 
Industrial Production (91.2-93.3) 11 11 21 160 1.50 1.95* 1.13 
Employment (92.1-95.4) 38 4 42 261 4.72* 8.23* 0.72 
 
The results of table 1 allow us to formulate the following conclusions. First, the R2’s 
suggest that employment changes are better explained by the model than either 
changes in industrial production or GDP. Second, the contribution of aggregate 
shocks to the total variability is generally higher than the contribution of country 
specific shocks. Put differently, changes in output  and employment tend to be 
dominated by common shocks. This is most pronounced for employment changes, 
and much less so for industrial production where common and country specific 
shocks are equally important. Third, there is still a large part of the total variability 
                                                 
4 Quarterly data are from IFS and OECD, Main Economic Indicators. Time series used in the analysis 
are represented in table 1. 
5 Since our explicit intention is to elaborate each central European country’s impact on the formation 
of the European OCA separately, we regress our static equation including the EU 15 plus one central 
European country in the country sample. We repeat the analysis for each central European country. We 
represent the summary of the estimation results for the static equation. (table 1) On the other hand, we 
have estimated  equation 1 taking into consideration the joint effects accruing from five central 
European countries on the European OCA. The complete estimation results which evaluate the EU 15 
together with five central European countries are presented in table 2 in appendix. 
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that is not explained by the model. One of the possible reasons is the shortness of the 
sample period. 
 
Table 1 also shows the F-tests of the joint significance of the coefficients of the CE-
countries. They test whether adding observations of these CE-countries to the model 
lead to structural changes in the model. We generally find that we must reject the 
hypothesis of no structural changes. This is especially so for the time coefficients that 
show significant structural changes when the CE-countries are added to the sample. It 
is much less the case for the coefficients of the country dummies. This suggests that 
the time pattern of the changes in output and employment differs significantly 
between the CE-countries and the EU-countries. This is much less the case with the 
average growth rates of output and employment (as measured by the country 
dummies). Thus, on average changes in output and employment did not seem to be 
significantly different in the CE-countries as compared with the EU. The difference 
may lie in a different time pattern. This conclusion should be handled with care, 
however, because our sample period is extremely short.  
 
In a next step we test whether the central European countries as a whole pass this test. 
In order to do so we grouped the central European countries’ observations together. 
We also grouped the other countries, i.e. the core, Scandinavia, Southern Europe, the 
UK and Ireland.6 The results are presented in table 3. The benchmark group of 
countries is the core. As a result, the coefficients of the country dummies have to be 
interpreted as deviations from the core. A simple t-test then measures whether the 
changes of employment and output have on average deviated significantly in central 
European countries from the core. As can be seen, we do not observe significant 
differences. The same holds for Southern Europe. It does not for the Scandinavian 
countries which have experienced significantly different employment changes. Thus, 
surprisingly, if we particularly focus on employment patterns we notice that central 
European countries come closer to forming part of an optimum currency area with the 
core countries than the Scandinavian countries.  
                                                 
6 Note that the European Regions grouped by Core (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands), South (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden) and Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia). 
Ireland and the United Kingdom are not specified. 
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1t-values are in parenthesis. An asterix indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 95% interval. 
 
 
2.2 The dynamic model 
The static model only allows for a country specific shock which is assumed to be the 
same each year. We cannot distinguish constant and non constant country effects over 
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time. In this section we incorporate an interaction term to the model which allows us 
to detect the non-constant country effects over time. We re-estimate the model by 
including this interaction term between the time and the country dummies for each 
country separately and we test whether the coefficients of these interaction terms are 
jointly significant. If they are, we can conclude that these country effects are not 
constant over time and that there is a typical output-employment cycle for the country 
concerned. We repeat the same regression for all the other countries in the sample.7 
The model now can be written as follows 
 
 
         T-1          N-1             T-1 
 ∆yi.t = a +Σ bt D  + Σt i i  c D  + Σ etDtDk + ei,t     (2) 
       t            i               t 
 for k = 1,..,N 
 
where DtDk  is the interaction term.  
 
We present the results concerning the significance of the interaction terms in table 4. 
(In appendix we show the full results in tables 5 to 9). Table 4 allows us to derive the 
following conclusions. For industrial production we find significantly different cycles 
in all CE-countries except for Slovenia. For GDP and employment we do not find any 
significant time varying effects. Thus, the results are mixed. One variable (industrial 
production appears to follow a strongly different cycle in most CE-countries, whereas 
other variables do not exhibit such differences.  
 
Table 4. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Specific Country Dummies 
 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial Production GDP Employment 
    
Czech Republic 18.45* 1.37 1.58 
Hungary 23.59* - 1.44 
Poland 4.96* - 1.16 
Slovak Republic 63.31* 1.23 0.48 
Slovenia 0.84 0.39 0.76 
 
 
Returning to the theoretical analysis of section 1 (figure 1) we can conclude that some 
CE-countries may now be located on the right hand side of the OCA-line. Slovenia, 
                                                 
7 As in the static model, in the dynamic model we are interested in the central European country’s 
‘individual’ effect on the European OCA analysis. Thus we will estimate dynamic equation including 
the EU 15 and only one central European country.  
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for example, comes closest to this possibility. This conclusion, however, should be 
considered as a provisional one. As we have indicated earlier, the data set we have 
used is rather short so that considerable uncertainty continues to exist about the issue 
of whether the Central European countries belong to the European OCA.  
 15
 Appendix:  
Table 2: Static Analysis: (Regression analysis for the static equation; time dummy coefficients should be 
interpreted w. r. t. the last year and country dummies should be interpreted w. r. t. Germany)  
∆yi .t Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Time Dummies    
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Czech Republic (Dynamic Analysis) 
Table 3a. Correlation Coefficients (in %) 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 18.02 25.60 44.69 
Belgium 18.04 - - 
Czech Republic 67.21 28.54 50.17 
Denmark 26.70 24.72 - 
Finland 34.28 18.19 64.68 
France 17.62 16.70 47.02 
Germany 18.23 14.59 43.80 
Greece 19.03 - 52.49 
Ireland 21.14 - 44.12 
Italy 16.47 - 43.45 
Luxembourg 24.91 - 43.75 
Netherlands 19.31 17.30 49.47 
Portugal 14.93 - 43.13 
Spain 14.86 17.07 44.03 
Sweden 19.34 65.27 44.93 
U. K. 17.53 16.78 44.84 
 
 
Table 3b. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 1.04 0.69 5.03* 
Belgium 1.01 - - 
Czech Republic 1.04 1.56 6.50* 
Denmark 1.68 1.21 - 
Finland 1.25 0.89 5.71* 
France 1.00 1.32 6.71* 
Germany 1.15 1.36 6.00* 
Greece 1.22 - 4.84* 
Ireland 1.23 - 5.88* 
Italy 1.13 - 5.26* 
Luxembourg 0.87 - 6.08* 
Netherlands 1.09 1.38 6.62* 
Portugal 1.39 - 5.45* 
Spain 1.14 1.37 5.84* 
Sweden 1.21 2.56* 4.99* 
U. K. 1.14 1.34 6.29* 
 
 
Table 3c. Joint F (Wald) Test for Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 0.89 0.16 1.73* 
Belgium 0.87 - - 
Czech Republic 2.88* 0.34 1.24 
Denmark 0.71 0.37 - 
Finland 0.81 0.21 2.18* 
France 0.87 0.15 2.03* 
Germany 0.81 0.16 1.52 
Greece 0.92 - 2.40* 
Ireland 0.50 - 1.39 
Italy 0.46 - 1.62 
Luxembourg 0.64 - 1.71* 
Netherlands 0.90 0.15 1.77* 
Portugal 0.42 - 1.70* 
Spain 0.46 0.15 1.67* 
Sweden 0.79 1.97* 1.71* 
U. K. 0.84 0.16 1.72* 
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Table 3d. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Specific Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 0.18 1.07 0.37 
Belgium 0.21 - - 
Czech Republic 18.45* 1.37 1.58 
Denmark 2.48* 1.05 - 
Finland 0.37 0.27 6.58* 
France 0.12 0.14 0.96 
Germany 0.21 0.14 0.34 
Greece 0.33 - 2.43* 
Ireland 0.66 - 0.26 
Italy 0.41 - 0.13 
Luxembourg 1.36 - 0.32 
Netherlands 0.33 0.19 1.58 
Portugal 0.25 - 0.11 
Spain 0.14 0.16 0.24 
Sweden 0.38 11.87* 0.42 
U. K. 0.11 0.14 0.45 
1 F-statistics with asterisks denote that the coefficients are significantly different at 95th percentile. 
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Hungary:  (Dynamic Analysis) 
Table 4a. Correlation Coefficients (in %) 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 19.86 46.89 
Belgium 19.76 - 
Denmark 25.62 - 
Finland 20.14 65.60 
France 19.43 48.84 
Germany 19.77 46.36 
Greece 22.46 54.58 
Hungary 72.26 44.95 
Ireland 21.37 46.51 
Italy 20.26 47.11 
Luxembourg 23.61 46.27 
Netherlands 19.86 51.30 
Portugal 20.10 45.64 
Spain 19.67 40.62 
Sweden 20.56 42.42 
U. K. 19.49 47.77 
 
 
Table 4b. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 1.82* 7.05* 
Belgium 1.80* - 
Denmark 2.27* - 
Finland 1.89* 7.92* 
France 1.84* 8.75* 
Germany 1.87* 8.09* 
Greece 2.08* 6.86* 
Hungary 4.49* 8.85* 
Ireland 1.85* 7.41* 
Italy 1.94* 7.81* 
Luxembourg 2.02* 8.12* 
Netherlands 1.80* 8.96* 
Portugal 1.92* 7.33* 
Spain 1.74* 8.21* 
Sweden 1.67 7.37* 
U. K. 1.99* 8.59* 
 
 
Table 4c. Joint F (Wald) Test for Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 1.02 0.97 
Belgium 0.94 - 
Denmark 1.07 - 
Finland 0.86 1.39 
France 1.00 1.22 
Germany 0.86 0.76 
Greece 1.05 1.57 
Hungary 3.74* 0.77 
Ireland 0.53 0.61 
Italy 1.00 0.92 
Luxembourg 1.08 0.94 
Netherlands 0.99 0.96 
Portugal 0.96 0.93 
Spain 1.00 0.86 
Sweden 0.93 1.02 
U. K. 0.97 0.89 
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Table 4d. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Specific Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 0.21 0.33 
Belgium 0.21 - 
Denmark 1.57 - 
Finland 0.26 6.46* 
France 0.15 0.84 
Germany 0.20 0.35 
Greece 0.65 2.46* 
Hungary 23.59* 1.44 
Ireland 0.46 0.25 
Italy 0.36 0.38 
Luxembourg 1.21 0.32 
Netherlands 0.21 1.48 
Portugal 0.36 0.12 
Spain 0.23 0.16 
Sweden 0.35 0.62 
U. K. 0.15 0.58 
1 F-statistics with asterisks denote that the coefficients are significantly different at 95th percentile. 
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Poland (Dynamic Analysis) 
Table 5a. Correlation Coefficients (in %) 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 22.62 42.75 
Belgium 23.71 - 
Denmark 34.43 - 
Finland 24.46 62.02 
France 21.78 43.21 
Germany 22.63 41.48 
Greece 31.57 49.96 
Ireland 22.97 41.33 
Italy 22.34 41.84 
Luxembourg 29.77 41.65 
Netherlands 22.53 45.59 
Poland 45.75 45.30 
Portugal 24.15 40.24 
Spain 22.98 40.60 
Sweden 26.98 42.70 
U. K. 22.28 42.81 
 
 
Table 5b. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 1.81* 6.53* 
Belgium 1.80* - 
Denmark 2.44* - 
Finland 1.61 7.07* 
France 1.88* 7.89* 
Germany 1.76* 7.33* 
Greece 1.79* 6.11* 
Ireland 1.95* 7.00* 
Italy 1.84* 7.10* 
Luxembourg 2.44* 7.46* 
Netherlands 1.59 8.02* 
Poland 2.31* 8.10* 
Portugal 1.68 6.53* 
Spain 1.61 6.91* 
Sweden 1.66 6.22* 
U. K. 2.03* 7.89* 
 
 
Table 5c. Joint F (Wald) Test for Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 1.14 0.83 
Belgium 1.12 - 
Denmark 2.27* - 
Finland 1.15 1.36 
France 1.11 1.20 
Germany 1.05 0.76 
Greece 1.40 1.51 
Ireland 0.77 0.52 
Italy 1.13 0.85 
Luxembourg 1.22 0.89 
Netherlands 1.19 0.91 
Poland 1.63 0.94 
Portugal 1.12 0.84 
Spain 1.11 0.85 
Sweden 1.21 0.82 
U. K. 1.13 0.88 
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Table 5d. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Specific Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
Employment 
Austria 0.29 0.59 
Belgium 0.49 - 
Denmark 2.86* - 
Finland 0.64 6.80* 
France 0.13 0.73 
Germany 0.29 0.41 
Greece 2.29* 2.49* 
Ireland 0.35 0.29 
Italy 0.23 0.39 
Luxembourg 1.74* 0.46 
Netherlands 0.38 1.30 
Poland 4.96* 1.16 
Portugal 0.57 0.10 
Spain 0.35 0.14 
Sweden 1.12 0.57 
U. K. 0.23 0.64 
1 F-statistics with asterisks denote that the coefficients are significantly different at 95th percentile. 
 
 23
Slovak Republic (Dynamic Analysis) 
Table 6a. Correlation Coefficients (in %) 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 14.79 25.76 45.52 
Belgium 15.66 - - 
Denmark 17.72 25.48 - 
Finland 14.58 18.08 65.99 
France 14.74 16.31 47.77 
Germany 14.03 15.92 44.84 
Greece 15.52 - 54.62 
Ireland 15.06 - 45.21 
Italy 14.61 - 44.66 
Luxembourg 17.44 - 44.72 
Netherlands 15.77 16.91 50.36 
Portugal 13.85 - 43.79 
Slovak Republic 86.26 27.09 45.90 
Spain 13.96 16.64 44.69 
Sweden 14.76 64.62 45.60 
U. K. 14.48 16.41 45.70 
 
 
Table 6b. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 1.03 0.68 5.76* 
Belgium 1.16 - - 
Denmark 1.08 1.26 - 
Finland 1.01 0.85 6.41* 
France 1.04 1.27 7.57* 
Germany 0.95 1.31 6.92* 
Greece 1.16 - 5.92* 
Ireland 0.95 - 6.79* 
Italy 1.01 - 6.15* 
Luxembourg 1.14 - 6.99* 
Netherlands 1.14 1.33 7.49* 
Portugal 0.98 - 6.20* 
Slovak Republic 1.04 1.57 6.50* 
Spain 1.00 1.31 6.61* 
Sweden 1.01 2.12* 5.67* 
U. K. 1.06 1.28 7.16* 
 
 
Table 6c. Joint F (Wald) Test for Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 0.77 0.19 1.31 
Belgium 0.61 - - 
Denmark 0.64 0.44 - 
Finland 0.58 0.24 1.65 
France 0.60 0.16 1.55 
Germany 0.56 0.18 1.04 
Greece 0.60 - 2.01* 
Ireland 0.48 - 1.06 
Italy 0.62 - 1.18 
Luxembourg 0.66 - 1.27 
Netherlands 0.60 0.17 1.23 
Portugal 0.58 - 1.27 
Slovak Republic 2.10* 0.32 1.23 
Spain 0.61 0.17 1.28 
Sweden 0.58 1.87 1.25 
U. K. 0.59 0.17 1.30 
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Table 6d. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Specific Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 0.14 1.21 0.40 
Belgium 0.30 - - 
Denmark 0.89 1.18 - 
Finland 0.11 0.30 7.02* 
France 0.13 0.13 0.98 
Germany 0.03 0.17 0.45 
Greece 0.25 - 2.92* 
Ireland 0.18 - 0.34 
Italy 0.18 - 0.23 
Luxembourg 0.99 - 0.42 
Netherlands 0.28 0.18 1.65 
Portugal 0.02 - 0.11 
Slovak Republic 63.31* 1.23 0.48 
Spain 0.04 0.16 0.24 
Sweden 0.14 11.58* 0.42 
U. K. 0.10 0.14 0.49 
1 F-statistics with asterisks denote that the coefficients are significantly different at 95th percentile. 
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Slovenia (Dynamic Analysis) 
Table 7a. Correlation Coefficients (in %) 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 36 35 44 
Belgium 36 - - 
Denmark 48 34 - 
Finland 36 26 63 
France 34 25 46 
Germany 34 24 43 
Greece 40 - 53 
Ireland 39 - 44 
Italy 35 - 44 
Luxembourg 44 - 43 
Netherlands 37 26 49 
Portugal 35 - 42 
Slovenia 37 26 45 
Spain 35 25 43 
Sweden 38 66 45 
U. K. 34 26 45 
 
 
Table 7b. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 3.31* 1.45 6.69* 
Belgium 3.32* - - 
Denmark 4.98* 2.17* - 
Finland 3.42* 1.53 7.10* 
France 3.24* 2.30* 8.27* 
Germany 3.17* 2.37* 7.62* 
Greece 3.85* - 6.45* 
Ireland 3.59* - 7.27* 
Italy 3.34* - 7.27* 
Luxembourg 4.09* - 7.64* 
Netherlands 3.59* 2.40* 8.55* 
Portugal 3.39* - 6.85* 
Slovenia 3.46* 2.21* 8.36* 
Spain 2.96* 2.38* 7.19* 
Sweden 3.18* 3.52* 6.43* 
U. K. 3.64* 2.41* 8.26* 
 
 
Table 7c. Joint F (Wald) Test for Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 2.83* 0.14 0.85 
Belgium 2.65* - - 
Denmark 3.40* 0.43 - 
Finland 2.40* 0.15 1.23 
France 2.72* 0.08 1.19 
Germany 2.37* 0.11 0.64 
Greece 3.05* - 1.53 
Ireland 1.52 - 0.56 
Italy 2.73* - 0.83 
Luxembourg 3.27* - 0.86 
Netherlands 2.83* 0.08 0.89 
Portugal 2.65* - 0.83 
Slovenia 2.91* 0.08 0.87 
Spain 2.72* 0.08 0.84 
Sweden 2.66* 1.60 0.87 
U. K. 2.65* 0.07 0.85 
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Table 7d. Joint F (Wald) Test for Time Specific Country Dummies 
Joint F-Tests  Industrial 
Production 
GDP Employment 
Austria 0.53 1.63 0.46 
Belgium 0.58 - - 
Denmark 4.77* 1.38 - 
Finland 0.57 0.35 6.32* 
France 0.26 0.19 0.81 
Germany 0.27 0.26 0.35 
Greece 1.52 - 2.79* 
Ireland 1.35 - 0.32 
Italy 0.62 - 0.45 
Luxembourg 3.53* - 0.32 
Netherlands 0.79 0.27 1.55 
Portugal 0.70 - 0.10 
Slovenia 0.84 0.39 0.76 
Spain 0.45 0.25 0.16 
Sweden 1.06 10.27* 0.56 
U. K. 0.27 0.27 0.67 
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